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COMMENCEMENT RULES AND TOLLING
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN
FEDERAL COURT: Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.
With Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,' the Supreme Court laid to
rest a quiet controversy over how a suit is commenced for the
purpose of tolling statutes of limitations.' In diversity actions
prior to Walker, federal courts applied either state commencement
rules3 or rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.4  In non-
diversity actions, however, federal courts uniformly applied rule
3.5
In Walker, the Supreme Court held that, in diversity actions,
state law defines commencement for the purpose of tolling the
state statute of limitations. By concluding that rule 3 does not
govern the tolling of the state statute of limitations when state law
is the source of a legal right,7 the Court avoided a direct conflict
between the federal rule and the state law. The Court, however,
offered no principled method for measuring the scope of a fed-
eral rule. Moreover, the analysis in Walker provides little guidance
for resolving choice of law problems in the absence of an appli-
cable federal rule. Finally, by limiting the scope of rule 3 in di-
versity actions, Walker raises new questions about the role of rule
3 in suits to enforce federally created rights.
100 S. Ct. 1978 (1980).
2 Statutes of limitations define the duration of a potential defendant's exposure to
liability. Under most limitation schemes, "a limited period of time is provided for the
bringing of an action and, if the action is not commenced in time, the lapse of time will
constitute a defense to the suit or will deprive the plaintiff of his right." W. FERGUSON, THE
STATUTES OF LIMITATION SAVING STATUTES 1 (1980). The limitations period usually begins
to run when the plaintiff's right of action accrues, but numerous circumstances may post-
pone the start of the statutory period. See Developments in the Law-Statutes of Limitations, 63
HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1220-37 (1950). Tolling, which is the suspension of the statute of
limitations, may also occur for various reasons after the period begins to run. See id. Com-
mencement defines the activity that permanently tolls the statute of limitations. For a dis-
cussion of the purposes of statutes of limitations, see Special Project, Time Bars in Specialized
Federal Common Law: Federal Rights of Action and State Statutes of Limitations, 65 CORNELL L.
REv. 1011, 1016-18 (1980).
- See note 31 and accompanying text infra.
4 See note 32 and accompanying text infra. For the text of rule 3, see text accompany-
ing note 8 infra.
I See notes 76-84 and accompanying text infra.
6 100 S. Ct. at 1985. Unless otherwise indicated, "commencement" in this Note means
commencement for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations.
7 Id.
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I
TOLLING STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN FEDERAL COURT
Rule 3 provides that "[a] civil action is commenced by filing a
complaint with the court."8  In drafting the federal rules, the
Advisory Committee recognized that the tolling of a statute of
limitations might affect substantive rights. As a result, the Com-
mittee was reluctant to define the scope of rule 3.9 Nevertheless,
for more than a decade following the adoption of the federal
rules in 1938, most federal courts in diversity actions held that
commencement pursuant to rule 3 tolled the applicable state stat-
ute of limitations.'" In Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse
Co.," however, the Supreme Court indicated that state commence-
ment rules, and not rule 3, apply in diversity cases.' 2
SFED. R. Civ. P. 3.
When a Federal or State statute of limitations is pleaded as a defense, a
question may arise under this rule whether the mere filing of the complaint
stops the running of the statute, or whether any further step is required, such
as, service of the summons and complaint or their delivery to the marshal for
service. The answer to this question may depend on whether it is competent for
the Supreme Court, exercising the power to make rules of procedure without
affecting substantive rights, to vary the operation of statutes of limitations. The
requirement of Rule 4(a) that the clerk shall forthwith issue the summons and
deliver it to the marshal for service will reduce the chances of such a question
arising.
FED. R. Civ. P. 3, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules, note 4, 28 U.S.C. app. at 394-95
(1976). See 2 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 3.07[1], at 3-45 to -47 (2d ed. 1980). The
Advisory Committee was concerned with the limitations imposed by the Rules Enabling
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976), which provides in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules,
the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and proce-
dure of the district courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil
actions ....
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and
shall preserve the right of trial by jury ....
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect
after such rules have taken effect....
'o See, e.g., Isaacks v. Jeffers, 144 F.2d 26 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 781 (1944);
Robinson v. Waterman S.S. Co., 7 F.R.D. 51 (D.N.J. 1947); Krisor v. Watts, 61 F. Supp.
845 (E.D. Wis. 1945); Gallagher v. Carroll, 27 F. Supp. 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1939). But see Zuck-
erman v. McCulley, 170 F.2d 1015 (8th Cir. 1948).
1 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
2 Id. at 533. In Ragan, a diversity action, the plaintiff filed his complaint within the
state's two year statute of limitations. Under Kansas law, however, an action commenced
for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations when ihe defendant was served, or on
filing, provided the plaintiff faithfully, properly, and diligently endeavored to procure
service and accomplished service within 60 days. The plaintiff in Ragan served the defen-
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Relying on the rationale of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins'" and
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, "4 the Ragan Court reasoned that state
commencement rules control because a federal court cannot give
a cause of action arising under state law longer life than would a
state court.'5 The Court also found in Ragan that the state com-
mencement procedure was an integral part of the state statute of
limitations.'6 In diversity actions after Ragan, federal courts
either uniformly applied state commencement rules "7 or distin-
guished Ragan by finding that a state commencement procedure
was not an integral part of the state statute of limitations.'8
Almost twenty years later, in Hanna v. Plumer,9 the Supreme
dant after both the statute of limitations and the 60 day extension had run. Applying the
Kansas law, the Court held that the plaintiff's action was time barred.
13 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie, the Supreme Court overruled the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which stated that federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction need not apply the non-statutory law of the state. The Court in Erie concluded
that "[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Act of Congress, the
law to be applied in any case is the law of the State." 304 U.S. at 78.
14 326 U.S. 99 (1945). In York, the Court held that federal courts must apply state
statutes of limitations when enforcing state created rights.
In essense, the intent of [Erie] was to insure that, in all cases where a federal
court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of
the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substan-
tially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it
would be if tried in a State court. The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins is that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a
non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a block away,
should not lead to a substantially different result.
Id. at 109.
337 U.S. 533-34. By relying on the rationale of Erie, the Ragan Court implicitly
applied the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976), which states: "The laws of the
several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil ac-
tions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply." See Mishkin, The
Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choke of National and State Rules
for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 800 n.16 (1956) ("Technically, [Erie] can be viewed as
an interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act ... .
16 337 U.S. at 534.
" See, e.g., Murphy v. Citizens Bank of Clovis, 244 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1957); Byrd v.
Bates, 243 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1957); Frith v. Associated Press, 176 F. Supp. 671 (E.D.S.C.
1959); Hagy v. Allen, 1053 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Ky. 1957); Ackerly v. Commercial Credit
Co., 111 F. Supp. 92 (D.N.J. 1953).
s See, e.g., Wright v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 242 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 939 (1957); Reisinger v. Cannon, 127 F. Supp. 50 (D. Conn. 1954); Glebus v.
Fillmore, 104 F. Supp. 903 (D. Conn. 1952).
19 380 U.S. 460 (1965). In Hanna, a diversity action, the plaintiff claimed damages for
personal injuries resulting from an automobile accident. Service was made by leaving
copies of the summons and the complaint with defendant's wife at his residence, in com-
pliance with rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. State law, however, re-
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Court determined that the Rules Enabling Act (REA), 0 and not
the Rules of Decision Act (RDA),2 governed the applicability of a
federal rule.2 2 Hanna prescribed a three-part test. First, a federal
court must determine whether a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
applies.2 - Second, the court must determine whether the rule
regulates procedure according to the terms of the REA.2 4  Finally,
the Court must determine whether the rule is within constitu-
tional limitations. 5 If the federal rule satisfies each of these three
quired in-hand service. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment, citing Ragan and York to support the conclusion that in diversity cases state law
measured the adequacy of service of process. See 380 U.S. at 462. The First Circuit
affirmed, concluding that the conflict between the state and federal rule concerned a "sub-
stantive rather than a procedural matter." 331 F.2d at 159. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the federal rule controlled. 380 U.S. at 474.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976), quoted at note 9 supra.
21 Id. § 1652, quoted at note 15 supra.
2 380 U.S. at 471.
2 Id. at 461.
24 Id. at 464. In Hanna, the Court construed the test created by the Rules Enabling Act
as "whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress
for disregard or infraction of them." Id. (quoting Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14
(1941)).
Professor Ely offers an alternative interpretation of the Rules Enabling Act. See Ely, The
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 718-38 (1974). He argues that the Act
creates two types of limitations. First, the Act authorizes a checklist-"anything that relates
to process, writs, pleadings, motions, or to practice and procedure generally, is autho-
rized." Id. at 718. Second, the Act contains an "enclave" limitation- "such rules shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right .... " 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). Ely argues
that Courts should examine "the character of the state provision that enforcement of the
Federal Rule in question will supplant, in particular ... whether the state provision embo-
dies a substantive policy or represents only a procedural disagreement with the federal
rulemakers respecting the fairest and most efficient way of conducting litigation." Ely,
supra, at 722 (footnote omitted). By applying this test, he argues, courts would avoid the
wholesale defeat of the Rules Enabling Act that would result from making the substantive/
procedural distinction based on an outcome-determinative test. Id. at 721-22.
Ely recognized that in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941), the Court collapsed
the two types of limitations into one. Ely, supra, at 719. Nevertheless, some courts have
applied the analysis suggested by Professor Ely. See, e.g., Platis v. Stockwell, 630 F.2d 1201,
1204-05 (7th Cir. 1980). At least one federal court, however, has criticized Ely's analysis:
If the suggested test were adopted, the attorney in this position would have to
research state law with regard to the matter covered in practically every federal
rule of civil procedure to determine if there were a contrary state rule sup-
ported by non-procedura state policies contrary to the policy of the rule in
question. No end of confusion, expense, and loss of judicial time and effort
would result.
Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 49 U.S.L.W. 2197, 2198 (E.D. Ky. September 8, 1980).
See generally Chayes, The Bead Game, 87 HARV. L. REV. 741, 751-52 (1974); Note, The Law
Applied in Diversity Cases: The Rules of Decision Act and the Erie Doctrine, 85 Yale LJ. 678,
701-05 (1976).
21 380 U.S. at 471-72. In Hanna, the Court indicated that the constitutional test is
satisfied if the regulated activity can be rationally classified as procedural:
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tests, then it controls.26
The Hanna Court did not overrule Ragan. Instead, the Court
distinguished Ragan on two grounds. First, the Court character-
ized Ragan as involving a federal rule that did not govern the
tolling of statutes of limitations.27  Thus, because no federal rule
covered the point, an REA inquiry was unnecessary in Ragan.
Second, the Court explained that in Ragan the application of the
state commencement procedure would have wholly barred recov-
ery, whereas in Hanna the state rule only would have altered the
manner in which process was served. 8 In distinguishing Ragan,
however, the Hanna Court overlooked the significant similarities.
The state service of process law in Hanna was also a statute of
limitations tolling provision that affected substantive state
policies. 2  By enforcing the federal rule for service of process,
For the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules
governing the practice and pleadings in those courts, which in turn includes a
power to regulate matters which, though falling within the uncertain area be-
tween substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either.
Id. at 472. For discussions of the constitutional limitations on Congress and the courts to,
regulate judicial procedures, see Ely, supra note 24, at 700-06; Note, Medical Malpractice
Panels and Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: Preserving Access to Federal Courts by Analyzing the
Nature of the Panel, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 337, 357 n.112 (1981); Note, supra note 24, at
701-05.
26 In Hanna, the Court determined that rule 4(d)(1) satisfied the requirements of the
three-part test. See 380 U.S. at 473-74.
27 380 U.S. at 470. In Ragan, however, the Court did not imply that rule 3 did not
cover the issue in dispute. Indeed, the Ragan Court recognized the use of rule 3 to toll
statutes of limitations in federal question actions. 337 U.S. at 533. See Note, Federal Rule 3
and the Tolling of State Statutes of Limitations in Diversity Cases, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1281, 1286
n.41 (1968); Note, Amending the Rules of Civil Procedure after Hanna v. Plumer: Rule 3, 42
N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 1139, 1144 (1967).
28 380 U.S. at 469. In Hanna, the defendant moved for dismissal before the state stat-
ute of limitations had run, claiming improper service of process. A delay of four days,
however, would have presented the same problem confronted in Ragan. The application of
the state service requirement would have wholly barred recovery.
29 Judge Aldrich, writing for the First Circuit in Hanna, recognized that the issue in-
volved more than defining the appropriate manner for serving process. Because the defen-
dant in Hanna was the executor of an estate, Massachusetts law imposed special notice
requirements "to effectuate the safe and 'speedy settlement of estates that the heirs might
be quieted."' 331 F.2d 157, 159 (1st. Cir. 1964) (quoting Brown v. Anderson, 13 Mass. 201,
202 (1816)), rev'd, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). Massachusetts protected these interests by creating
a special statute of limitations:
The so-called "short statute of limitations," Mass. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 197, § 9,
provides that actions against an executor must be "commenced within one year
from the time of his giving bond." In addition to timely commencement, the
statute provides that the executor "shall not be held to answer" unless within
the year he had been served in hand, or "service * * * [is] accepted by him," or
846
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the Hanna Court had undermined the reasoning in Ragan."0
Because the court refused to overrule Ragan, the confusion
regarding the application of rule 3 in tolling state statutes of
limitations persisted. Federal courts responded to Hanna in one of
three fashions. Some courts concluded that Ragan was still good
law and applied the state commencement procedure.3' Others
concluded that Hanna had overruled Ragan, and that rule 3 gov-
erned the tolling of state statutes of limitations." The remaining
courts recognized that Ragan was still good law, but distinguished
it on the ground that a state commencement procedure was not
an integral part of the state statute of limitations.3 In Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp. 14 the Supreme Court reaffirmed Ragan and
there has been filed in the proper registry of probate a notice identifying the
claim, the claimant and "the court in which the action has been brought."
331 F.2d at 158-59.
In Marshall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1974), Judge Aldrich limited the holding
of Hanna by focusing on the Court's failure to recognize the substantive component of the
state law. In Marshall, a diversity action, the First Circuit ruled on a conflict between feder-
al rule 15(c) and the state rule governing the relation back of amendments in pleadings.
Under Hanna's three-part test, the federal rule should have controlled. Judge Aldrich,
however, argued that the Supreme Court had failed to recognize the substantive implica-
tions of the state law in Hanna. Id. at 41-42. As a result, he contended, Hanna only states "a
principle for resolving a direct conflict between two strictly procedural rules." Id. at 44.
Faced with a conflict in Marshall involving clearly substantive implications, Judge Aldrich
distinguished Hanna and applied a balancing test under which he ultimately adopted the
state rule.
" Indeed, Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Hanna, recognized the weakness
in the Court's treatment of Ragan, and concluded that Ragan, "if still good law, would ...
call for affirmance of the result reached by the Court of Appeals." 380 U.S. at 476. Justice
Harlan argued, however, that Ragan "was wrong." Id. at 477. For contemporaneous discus-
sions of the impact of Hanna, see Stason, Choice of Law Within the Federal System: Erie v.
Hanna, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 377, 394-404 (1967); McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine
Changes Shape, 52 VA. L. REv. 884, 888-92 (1965); Note, 20 STAN. L. RFv., supra note 27, at
1286-87.
-" See, e.g., Rose v. K.K. Masutoku Toy Factory Co., 597 F.2d 215, 218 (10th Cir.
1979); Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1123 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 856 (1979); Witherow v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 530 F.2d 160, 166 (3d Cir.
1976); Anderson v. Papillion, 445 F.2d 841, 842 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Groninger v.
Davison, 364 F.2d 638, 642 (8th Cir. 1966) (questioning Ragan); Sylvester v. Messler, 351
F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1965) (per curiam), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
32 See, e.g., Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 568 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied., 440 U.S.
940 (1979); Smith v. Peters, 482 F.2d 799, 802 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 989
(1974); Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 389 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968); Manatee Cablevi-
sion Corp. v. Pierson, 433 F. Supp. 571, 575-76 (D.D.C. 1977); Benn v. Linden Came Co.,
370 F. Supp. 1269, 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Krout v. Bridges, 58 F.R.D. 560, 562 (N.D. Iowa
1973).
" See, e.g., Prashar v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 480 F.2d 947, 953 (8th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 994 (1974); Chappell v. Rouch, 448 F.2d 446, 450-51 (10th Cir. 1971);
Chladek v. Sterns Transp. Co., 427 F. Supp. 270, 274 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
14 100 S. Ct. 1978, 1983-84 (1980).
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eliminated the confusion over the application of rule 3 in diversity
actions."
II
WALKER V. ARMCO STEEL CORP.
Fred Walker was injured on August 22, 1975.36 Claiming
diversity of citizenship, he filed suit in federal court on August
19, 1977, s7 shortly before the state's two year statute of limitations
would have expired." Although a summons was issued that same
day, service of process was not made on defendant's authorized
agent until December 1, 1977.9 Because of the delay, the action
did not commence under state law until the summons was served
on the defendant.40 Relying on Ragan, the district court held that
the plaintiff's action was time barred because the state commence-
ment procedure was an integral part of the state statute of
limitations.4' On appeal, the plaintiff argued that Hanna had im-
plicitly overruled Ragan, and that rule 3 was a valid tolling
provision." The Tenth Circuit concluded that Hanna was "ir-
s See, e.g., Calhoun v. Ford, 625 F.2d 576 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
Walker, a carpenter, was injured while pounding a nail into a cement wall. Walker
claimed that the nail contained a defect that caused its head to shatter and strike him in
the right eye, resulting in permanent injury. 100 S. Ct. at 1980.
-7 Id. at 1980-81.
1 Id. at 1981 & n.3. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 95 (1971).
'9 100 S. Ct. at 1981.
4' See id. n.4; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 97 (1971). Under state law, if the complaint is
filed within the limitations period, and the plaintiff serves the defendant within 60 days,
then the action is deemed to commence, for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitation,
on the date of filing, even though service may have occurred outside the limitations
period. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 97 (West Supp. 1980) provides:
An action shall be deemed commenced, within the meaning of this article
[statute of limitations], as to each defendant, at the date of the summons which
is served on him, or on a co-defendant, who is a joint contractor or otherwise
united in interest with him.... An attempt to commence an action shall be
deemed equivalent to the commencement thereof, within the meaning of this
article, when the party faithfully, properly and diligently endeavors to procure
a service; but such attempt must be followed by the first publication or service
of the summons, ... within sixty (60) days.
In Walker, service of process was not effectuated within this 60 day period. 100 S. Ct. at
1981. The reason for the delay was unclear. During oral argument, Walker's attorney
stated that the summons was found in an unmarked folder in a filing cabinet in counsel's
office some 90 days after the complaint had been filed. Id. at 1981 n.2.
"' 452 F. Supp. 243, 245 (W.D. Okla. 1978), affd, 592 F.2d 1133 (10th Cir. 1979), affd,
100 S. Ct. 1978 (1980).
42 592 F.2d 1133, 1135 (10th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 100 S. Ct. 1978 (1980).
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reconcilable" with Ragan,41 but nonetheless felt constrained by
Ragan, and affirmed.44
The Supreme Court also recognized that Walker was indis-
tinguishable from Ragan,4s and confronted the apparent incon-
sistency between Ragan and Hanna. The Walker Court expressly
approved the reasoning used in Hanna to distinguish Ragan,4' and
held that in diversity actions rule 3 does not toll the state statute
of limitations. 47  Referring to the plain meaning of the rule, the
Court reasoned that nothing in rule 3 indicates that it had been
intended to toll state statutes of limitations, much less displace
state tolling rules.48  The Court concluded that in diversity cases
no federal rule applies, and that the RDA, as interpreted by Erie
and Ragan,49 commands that federal courts apply state law.
III
Walker: A FAILURE OF METHODOLOGY
Walker does not merely reaffirm Ragan. By expressly limiting
the scope of rule 3, Walker renders the Ragan rationale super-
fluous. In Ragan, the Court applied state law because the state
commencement procedure was substantive-an integral part of
the state statue of limitations.50  In contrast, by constricting the
43 Inasmuch as Ragan is based entirely upon the Guaranty Trust conception
that outcome determinative is the answer, the refusal of the Court to apply this
result in the Hanna decision is irreconcilable with that in Ragan.
We simply point up the dilemma. We do not do so in any spirit of critic-
ism. The present problem is, however, that the Supreme Court in Hanna,
although it could be said to have shown dissatisfaction with Ragan, did not
expressly overrule it.... It is true, however, that although the circuits are di-
vided on the question, the preponderance of the circuits and the district courts
within the circuits support the view that Ragan continues to be viable.
592 F.2d at 1136.
44 Id.
45 100 S. Ct. at 1984.
4 Id. at 1983-84. See notes 27-28 and accompanying text supra.
47 "In our view, in diversity actions Rule 3 governs the date from which various timing
requirements of the federal rules begin to run, but does not affect state statutes of limita-
tions." 100 S. Ct. at 1985. (footnote omitted).
48 Id. at 1985 & nn. 9 & 10.
11 See notes 13-14 and accompanying text supra.
' See 337 U.S. at 533-34. Before Walker, courts could limit Ragan to state commence-
ment procedures that were an "integral-part" of the state statute of limitations. See, e.g.,
Prashar v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 480 F.2d 947, 953 (8th Cir. 1972). There the
court said:
We conclude that it is only when a state legislates a rule regarding the com-
mencement of action as an integral part of the statute of limitations that a state
policy making a mode of enforcing a state-created right intrinsically material to
850 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:842
scope of rule 3, Walker eliminates the necessity of determining
whether each state's commencement procedure is an integral part
of the state's statute of limitations." Even when a state com-
mencement procedure is not an integral part of the state statute
of limitations, rule 3 does not apply. After Walker, rule 3 has no
tolling substance in actions to enforce state created rights.
In Walker, the Court purported to determine the scope of
rule 3 by examining the plain meaning of the rule. Although ac-
knowledging the Advisory Committee's suggestion that rule 3
might serve to toll statutes of limitations, 2 the Court concluded
that the plain meaning of rule 3 indicates that it is not a tolling
53provision. This conclusory analysis ignores numerous
commentaries 5 and lower federal court decisions 5 that have con-
the right involved becomes clearly discernible and substantial. It is only then
that Erie principles as set forth in Ragan must govern the litigation.
Id.; see Note, 20 STAN. L. REv., supra note 27, at 1283 n.21; notes 16-18 and accompanying
text supra. But see 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 3.07 [4.-3-1], at 3-97 (2d ed. 1980).
-" In one sense, every commencement procedure is an integral part of the state statute
of limitations because every statute of limitations must have a tolling provision. Nonethe-
less, some statutes of limitations incorporate specific commencement procedures designed
to implement special state policies. See Ely, supra note 24, at 730-32. In Walker, for exam-
ple, the Court noted that the Oklahoma commencement procedure involved more than the
general policies behind all statutes of limitations:
The importance of actual service, with corresponding actual notice, to the stat-
ute of limitations scheme in Oklahoma is further demonstrated by the fact that
under Okla. Stat., Tit. 12, § 97 (1971) the statute of limitations must be tolled
as to each defendant through individual service, unless a codefendant who is
served is "united in interest" with the unserved defendant. That requirement,
like the service requirement itself, does nothing to promote the general policy
behind all statutes of limitations of keeping stale claims out of court. Instead,
the service requirement furthers a different but related policy decision: that
each defendant has a legitimate right not to be surprised by notice of a lawsuit
after the period of liability has run.
100 S. Ct. at 1986 n.12. Not all state commencement procedures are integral parts of the
state statute of limitations. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-203 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN §§ 15-2-30, 39 (1967). See also 231 PA. CODE Rule 1007. Nevertheless, by narrowly
interpreting rule 3, the Court adopted a prophylactic convention that avoids the necessity
of determining whether each state's commencement procedure is an integral part of its
statute of limitations.
52 For the text of the Advisory Note, see note 9 supra. In Walker, the Court explained:
This Note establishes that the Advisory Committee predicted the problem
which arose in Ragan and arises again in the instant case. It does not indicate,
however, that Rule 3 was intended to serve as a tolling provision for statute of
limitations purposes; it only suggests that the Advisory Committee thought the
Rule might have that effect.
100 S. Ct. at 1985 n.10 (emphasis in original).
51 Id. at 1985 & nn. 9 & 10.
' See, e.g., Wheaton, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Interpreted, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 28, 30
(1939). There the author observes:
Until a complaint has been filed no action has been commenced. However, the
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strued rule 3 as a tolling provision. Moreover, the Court recog-
nized that in actions to enforce federal rights, federal courts have
universally applied rule 3 to toll statutes of limitations.16  If the
plain meaning of the rule controls, then the scope of rule 3
should not differ in actions to enforce federal rights. Neverthe-
less, the Court explicitly refrained from deciding the scope of rule
3 in actions based on federal law. 7
The opinion in Walker suggests that the Court looked beyond
the plain meaning of rule 3. Under a plain meaning analysis, the
substantive nature of state law should not affect the scope of a
potentially conflicting federal rule." In Walker, however, the
Court compared rule 3 to the state commencement procedure.
The Court described the state commencement law as "an integral
part of the several policies served by the statute of limitations,"59
and concluded that "[rule 3 does not replace such policy deter-
minations found in state law." 6 0  By focusing on the substantive
component of state law, the Court undermined its plain meaning
rationale.
If the Court did not apply a plain meaning analysis, then
Walker implicitly reformulates the process for testing the validity
of the federal rule. Under the test prescribed by Hanna, a court
must first determine whether a federal rule applies. If a federal
filing of the complaint with the court tolls the statute of limitations, irrespective
of the fact that the period of limitation expired before service of summons and
complaint on defendant, for an action is commenced by filing the complaint.
The language of Rule 3 is too plain to admit of discussion or to leave any
doubt as to this. A commentator has said he thinks the filing of a complaint
conditionally suspends the running of a statute of limitations, provided the sum-
mons is issued forthwith and served within a reasonable time thereafter.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted) (referring to Rowstein, Pleading and Practice
under the New Federal Rules, 73 U.S.L. REv. 21 (1939)).
11 See notes 32-33 supra.
6 See 100 S. Ct. at 1985 n. 11; notes 76-84 and accompanying text infra.
57 100 S. Ct. at 1985.
1 Under the plain meaning rule, the sole evidence of legislative intent is the language
of the statute:
[W]hen words are free from doubt they must be taken as the final expression
of the legislative intent, and are not to be added to or subtracted from by
considerations drawn from ... any extraneous source. In other words, the lan-
guage being plain, and not leading to asurd or wholly impracticable conse-
quences, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent.
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 490 (1917). See generally 2A C. SANDS,
SUTHERLAND'S STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §.46.01 (4th ed. 1972); see also
Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the
Modern Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299 (1975) (discussing the use of the plain
meaning rule to preclude resort to legislative history in interpreting federal statutes).
19 100 S. Ct. at 1985.
H0 Id. at 1986.
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rule does apply, then the court must determine whether the rule
transgresses either the REA or the Constitution.6' In Walker, the
Court reversed the order of Hanna's three-part test. The Court
first determined the statutory and constitutional restrictions by
analyzing the state commencement rule. After concluding that the
state rule was an integral part of the state's statute of limitations,
the Court recognized the restrictions placed on the federal rule,62
and defined the rule in a manner that avoided any conflict. 6
Although the Court denied that it was narrowly construing the
rule "in order to avoid a 'direct collision' with state law," 6 the
analysis in Walker suggests the opposite.65
After determining that rule 3 did not apply, the Walker
Court concluded that the state commencement procedure con-
trolled. The Court's RDA analysis, however, contains troubling
omissions. The Court failed to examine properly the "twin aims
of the Erie rule: the discouragement of forum shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws." 66  The
Court acknowledged that failure to apply state law "might not cre-
ate any problem of forum shopping, "67 but concluded that "the
61 See notes 19-26 and accompanying text supra.
62 Had the Court held that rule 3 tolls statutes of limitations in diversity actions, strong
arguments exist that the REA would have invalidated the application of the rule because of
the substantive nature of the right involved. The right involved, the state commencement
procedure, is substantive because it is an integral part of the state statute of limitations. See
Ely, supra note 24, at 730-33; notes 23-26 and accompanying text supra. But see Chayes,
supra note 24, at 748-50.
's This procedural reversal is not merely a formalistic change. Under Walker's implicit
approach, the impact of the federal rules may be significantly reduced. Whenever a federal
rule is capable of a narrow interpretation, as was rule 3, federal courts may narrowly
interpret the rule to avoid any possible conflict with substantive state law. Rather than give
a federal rule its broadest meaning, federal courts may narrowly construe the rule regard-
less of the rule's ability in its broadest form to satisfy the Hanna test. See Westen & Leh-
man, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MicH. L. REV. 311, 343 (1980)
("[T]he [Ragan] Court may have deliberately construed rule 3 narrowly in order to avoid
deciding whether a broader construction would be valid.").
64
This is not to suggest that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be nar-
rowly construed in order to avoid a "direct collision" with state law. The Feder-
al Rules should be given their plain meaning. If a direct collision with state law
arises from that plain meaning, then the analysis in Hanna v. Plumer applies.
100 S. Ct. at 1985 n.9.
s The Walker Court further undermined its claim by noting that in Hanna, "the 'clash'
between Rule 4(d)(1) and the state in-hand service requirement was 'unavoidable.' Id. at
1985 (emphasis added) (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 470). Presumably, if a court
can avoid a conflict by narrowly construing a rule, then the "clash" is not "unavoidable."
6 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 US. at 468 (footnote omitted).
67 100 S. Ct. at 1986 n.15.
, -
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result would be an 'inequitable administration' of the law." 6  The
Court, however, failed to explain the inequities of such a result,
noting only that the outcome would differ.69  Ironically, Hanna
had rejected the outcome determination test in "considered
dictum."70  In Hanna, the Court explained that even in the ab-
sence of an applicable federal rule, "outcome determination"
analysis is not controlling.7' According to Hanna, the "twin aims
of Erie" are not violated unless the failure to adopt state law sub-
stantially alters the enforcement of state created rights.72 The
Walker Court never explained how the failure to adopt the state
commencement procedure would substantially alter the enforce-
ment of a state created right.73  Thus, while expressing concern
68 Id. at 1986 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 468).
69 There is simply no reason why, in the absence of a controlling federal rule, an
action based on state law which concededly would be barred in the state courts
by the state statute of limitations should proceed through litigation to judgment
in federal court solely because of the fortuity that there is diversity of
citizenship between the litigants. The policies underlying diversity jurisdiction
do not support such a distinction between state and federal plaintiffs, and Erie
and its progeny do not permit it.
100 S. Ct. at 1986.
Ely, supra note 24, at 710. Professor Ely points out that the majority in Hanna care-
fully added the dictum concerning the rule of decision in the absence of an applicable
federal rule in an attempt to clarify the meaning of Erie:
The point of the Hanna dictum is that it is difficult to find unfairness of a sort
that would have troubled the framers of the Rules of Decision Act, or of a sort
whose elimination would justify disrupting a federal court's routine, when the
difference between the federal and state rules is trivial, when their require-
ments are essentially fungible.... Thus, whenever the sanction for noncom-
pliance is dismissal, there is a sense in which "enforcement" of the rule can be
outcome determinative. But it is a backhanded sense, and one that implicates
the concerns that gave rise to the Rules of Decision Act only when the under-
lying mandate thus enforced is sufficiently more or less burdensome than its
state counterpart to support a plausible claim of unfairness.
Id. at 713-14 (footnotes omitted).
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. at 466-69.
72 That the York test was an attempt to effectuate these policies is demonstrated by
the fact that the opinion framed the inquiry in terms of "substantial" variations
between state and federal litigation. Not only are nonsubstantial, or trivial,
variations not likely to raise the sort of equal protection problems which trou-
bled the Court in Erie; they are also unlikely to influence the choice of a forum.
The "outcome-determination" test therefore cannot be read without reference
to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum-shopping and avoid-
ance of inequitable administration of the law.
Id. at 467-68 (citation and footnote omitted).
"' The Court may have assumed that all commencement procedures are an integral
part of the state's statute of limitations, and, thus, an integral part of the state created
right. Hence, failure to adopt the state commencement procedure would substantially alter
the enforcement of a state created right. See 100 S. Ct. at 1986.
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over the doctrine of stare decisis, 74 the Walker Court failed to ana-
lyze the choice of law issues in accord with Erie and its progeny.5
IV
COMMENCEMENT IN NON-DIVERSiTY ACTIONS AFTER Walker
Three years before Ragan, in Bomar v. Keyes, 6 the Second
Circuit held that the filing of a complaint pursuant to rule 3 tolls
the statute of limitations in federal question cases." Following
Bomar, federal courts uniformly applied rule 3 as a tolling provi-
sion in actions to enforce federally created rights," whether the
statute of limitations was set by Congress79 or borrowed from state
law.8 0 Ragan did not upset this uniformity; " indeed, Ragan
74 Id. at 1984.
7- The weakness of the Court's RDA analysis is also evident from Walker's failure to
consider Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). In Byrd, the Court
adopted a balancing test to decide between conflicting state and federal rules in the ab-
sence of an applicable Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Prior to Walker, many commenta-
tors had argued that Byrd did not survive Hanna. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 24, at 717 n.130;
Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91
HARV. L. Rv. 356, 368-69 (1977); Stason, supra note 30, at 404. But see Miller, Federal Rule
44.1 and the "Fact" Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine,
65 MICH. L. REv. 613, 715 n.375 (1967). The Court's silence in Walker may give added
strength to these predictions.
76 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947).
" Id. at 140-41. Bomar, however, explicitly avoided considering whether any subsequent
delay should be charged to the plaintiff in computing the period of limitations. Id. at 141.
A number of federal courts additionally have required the plaintiff to exercise due dili-
gence in securing issuance and service of the summons after the filing of the complaint.
See, e.g., Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598, 606 (2d Cir. 1968); Benn v.
Linden Crane Co., 370 F. Supp. 1269, 1279 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Hukill v. Pacific & Artic Ry.
& Navig. Co., 159 F. Supp. 571, 575 (D.C. Alaska 1958). But see Moore Co. v. Sid Richard-
son Carbon & Gas Co., 347 F.2d 931, 924 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 925 (1966)
(adequate remedy for lack of due diligence available under rule 41(b)); McCrea v. General
Motors Corp., 53 F.R.D. 384, 385 (D. Mont. 1971) (adequate remedy for lack of due dili-
gence available under rule 41(b)).
"' Of course, where Congress spedfically mandates what steps are necessary to toll the
applicable statute of limitations, rule 3 does not operate. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 256 (1977) (specifically stating that an action is commenced for the
purpose of tolling statute of limitations upon filing).
79 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 156 (1976) (antitrust, four years); 17 U.S.C. § 507 (1976) (copy-
right, three years); 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1976) (patent, six years).
I Congress continues to create federal rights without providing a limitations period.
See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1976) (antifraud provision);
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1976); Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 88 201-219 (1976); Civil Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. 88 1981-1988
(1976); Outer Continental Oil Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§1331-1343 (1976); Com-
munications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. 88 151-609 (1976); Military Selective Service Act, 50
U.S.C. 88 459-473 (1976). Federal courts have responded by borrowing applicable state
statutes of limitations. See Special Project, supra note 2, passim.
1, See, e.g., Hoffman v. Haden, 268 F.2d 280, 302 (9th Cir. 1959); Jackson v. Duke,
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appeared to recognize the validity of Bomar by explicitly distin-
guishing it.82  Even after Hanna's recharacterization of Ragan,
federal courts continued to rely on Bomar when construing rule 3
in non-diversity actions. 3 In Walker, the Court expressly reserved
the question of what commencement procedure applies in actions
based on federal law.4
In actions to enforce federally created rights after Walker,
courts can choose from four alternative approaches for defining
commencement. First, federal courts can limit Walker to diversity
actions and apply rule 3 as a tolling provision. Second, courts can
hold that rule 3 no longer applies and create a federal common
law rule that applies in all actions arising under federal law.
Third, courts can apply state commencement rules in all cases.
Fourth, courts can apply a federal common law commencement
rule when federal law directly provides the applicable statute of
limitations, and apply a state commencement rule when federal
law borrows the state statute of limitations. Of these alternatives, a
federal common law rule providing that the filing of a complaint
tolls the applicable statute of limitations presents the best
approach.
The first alternative is the simplest. By applying rule 3 as a
tolling provision in actions to enforce federal rights, courts would
continue a longstanding rule of federal practice. 5 Since Walker,
several courts have adopted this alternative.5 Moreover, this
approach comports well with the purposes of the federal rules.
One reason for enacting the federal rules was to establish pro-
259 F.2d 3, 6 (5th Cir. 1958); Von Clemm v. Smith, 204 F. Supp. 110, 113 (S.D.N.Y.
1962).
'2 The Ragan Court explained:
It is accordingly argued that since the suit was properly commenced in the
federal court before the Kansas statute of limitations ran, it tolled the statute.
That was the reasoning and result in Bomar v. Keyes. But that case was a suit
to enforce rights under a federal statute.
337 U.S. at 533 (citation and footnotes omitted).
8 See, e.g., United States v. Wahl, 583 F.2d 285, 288 (6th Cir. 1978); Moore Co. v. Sid
Richardson Carbon & Gas Co., 347 F.2d 921, 922 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 925
(1966); David v. Krauss, 478 F. Supp. 823, 835 (E.D.N.Y. 1979); Triplett v. Azordegan,
478 F. Supp. 872, 878 (N.D. Iowa 1977); Preveza Shipping Co. v. Sucrest Corp., 397 F.
Supp. 954, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
4 See 100 S. Ct. at 1985 n. 11 ("We do not here address the role of Rule 3 as a tolling
provision for a statute of limitations, whether set by federal law or borrowed from state
law, if the cause of action is based on federal law.").
85 See notes 76-83 and accompanying text supra.
81 See Appleton Elec. Co. v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., No. 79-1640 (7th Cir. Nov. 25,
1980); Smith v. WGBH-TV, No. 77-2902-MA (D. Mass. Oct. 21, 1980).
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cedural uniformity in federal courts." Although Walker fore-
closes complete uniformity, courts could minimize disuniformity
by broadly interpreting rule 3 in actions to enforce federal rights.
Moreover, the federal rules were designed to insure that cases
would be decided on their merits. " By applying rule 3 in all
non-diversity cases, federal courts would remove a trap for un-
wary litigants.
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly applied
different interpretations of the same federal rule based on the
source of a legal right, the Walker Court did not foreclose such a
practice. One difficulty with this approach, however, is that it con-
tradicts the plain meaning rationale used in Walker to determine
the scope of rule 3.89 Because the language of rule 3 is the same
in diversity and non-diversity actions, the plain meaning of the
rule should also remain the same.
The second alternative would avoid this apparent incon-
sistency. Under this approach, federal courts could create a uni-
form common law commencement rule consistent with Bomar's in-
terpretation of rule 3.90 The filing of a complaint would continue
to toll the applicable statute of limitations in all actions arising
87 "One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules is to bring about uniformity
in the federal courts by getting away from local rules. This is especially true of
matters which relate to the adminstration of legal proceedings, an area in which
federal courts have traditionally exerted strong inherent power, completely
aside from the powers of Congress expressly conferred in the Rules."
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472-73 (1965) (quoting Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963)). See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO
& H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
668-76 (2d ed. 1973 & Supp. 1981) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER].
's See United States v. Hougham, 364 U.S. 310, 317 (1960) ("The Federal Rules reject
the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may be
decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate
a proper decision on the merits.") (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957)).
See notes 52-60 and accompanying text supra.
o The federal common law rule could take a variety of forms. For example, an action
could be deemed to commence for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations at the
filing of the complaint (Bomar's interpretation of rule 3), at the filing of the complaint and
the issuance of summons, or at the time service is obtained. See Blume & George, Limita-
tions and the Federal Courts, 49 MICH. L. REv. 937, 980-81 (1951). For several reasons,
however, the establishment of a federal common law rule consistent with Bomar's inter-
pretation of rule 3 is preferable. First, such a rule would comport with prior uniform
practice in non-diversity action. See notes 76-84 and accompanying text supra. Second, com-
mencement by filing a complaint is an extension of a longstanding practice in equity. Equity
courts determined that the purposes behind statutes of limitations only require the filing
of the complaint, when accompanied by prompt service of process. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1056, at 179 (1969).
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under federal law in the federal courts. This approach would
serve the interests of uniformity and simplicity 9' without contra-
dicting the plain meaning of rule 3 as interpreted by the Walker
Court.9 2
The third alternative would allow federal courts to adopt
state commencement rules as the governing federal rule in all
cases. In analogous situations arising under federal law, the Su-
preme Court has often borrowed state law rather than create
federal common law. Although this approach would maximize
9 The Supreme Court has adopted this approach in similar situations. See, e.g., Cope v.
Anderson, 331 U.S. 461 (1947) (applying federal common law rule of accrual); Schreiber v.
Sharpless, 110 U.S. 76 (1884) (applying federal common law rule of survival).
I The power of the federal courts to create common law to fill the interstices of fed-
eral statutes is unquestioned. See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 87, at 762-70.
Assuming that no federal rule applies to toll statutes of limitations, the determinative
choice of law statute is the RDA, not the REA. Unless the Constitution, treaties, or acts of
Congress "otherwise require or provide," the RDA mandates the adoption of state law. 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1976). See note 15 supra. The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the
"otherwise require or provide" language of the RDA. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327
U.S. 392, 394 (1946); Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-50
(1939). Thus, if the source of the right in issue derives from the Constitution, treaties, or
statutes of the United States, then state law need not be applied. See Hill, State Procedural
Law in Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 HARV. L. REv. 66, 73 (1956); Special Project, supra
note 2, at 1038-42. This broad interpretation of the RDA, however, is controversial. In-
deed, lower federal courts continue to apply state law based on the Supreme Court's ear-
lier narrow interpretation of the RDA. See, e.g., Wright v. Tennessee, 613 F.2d 647, 648
(6th Cir. 1980); International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Fishback & Moore, Inc., 350
F.2d 936, 938-39 (9th Cir. 1965); Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp., 392 F. Supp. 804,
805 (N.D. Ohio 1975); cf. UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704 (1966)
(citing cases decided under the RDA).
9s See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 100 S. Ct. 1790 (1980) (borrowing state
limitations period and tolling rules in § 1983 action); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) (borrowing state tolling rules in a § 1981 action); UAW v.
Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966) (borrowing state statute of limitations in suit
to enforce collective bargaining agreement under § 301 of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act). See also Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) (borrowing state abatement
rules in a § 1983 action because of the command of § 1988).
When Congress is silent, federal courts presumptively apply the limitations law of the
forum state:
[T]he silence of Congress has been interpreted to mean that it is federal policy
to adopt the local law.... The implied absorption of State [law] within the
interstices of the federal enactments is a phase of fashioning remedial details
where Congress has not spoken but left matters for judicial determination with-
in the general framework of familiar legal principles.
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946) (citations omitted) (citing Board of
County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 349-52 (1939)). See Occidental Life Ins.
Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392,
395 (1946)); Special Project, supra note 2, passim. Although this implied absorption is the
"primary guide, ... it is not [the] exclusive guide." Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975). "[C]onsiderations of state law may be displaced where their
application would be inconsistent with the federal policy underlying the cause of action
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uniformity within each jurisdiction, it would complicate proce-
dures in the federal system because of variations among the
states.Y Moreover, Congress has explicitly defined the limitations
period for many federal actions.95 By establishing a federal stat-
ute of limitations, Congress has indicated a desire to govern uni-
formly defendants' exposure to liability. The lack of uniformity
among the states in defining commencement, however, would
cause limitation periods to vary.96  This, in turn, might encourage
forum shopping and produce inequitable results.
The fourth alternative recognizes the close relationship be-
tween commencement procedures and the substantive policies of
statutes of limitations. Under this approach, federal courts would
adopt a hybrid of state and federal commencement rules. When
federal statutes expressly define the limitations period, courts
would apply a federal common law rule of commencement; when
federal law borrows a state's limitations period, courts would bor-
row the state commencement procedure. The underlying
rationale of Ragan and Walker-that state commencement proce-
dures are an integral part of state statutes of limitations-
supports this approach. " The hybrid approach assumes that
when Congress fails to provide a specific limitations period, it has
under consideration." Id. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 100 S. Ct. 1790, 1795 (1980);
Occidental Life Ins. Co., v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977).
Consider, for example, the problems in determining the applicable statute of limita-
tions when suits are transferred within the federal system because of improper venue or
lack of personal jurisdiction. See Note, Choice of Law in Federal Court After Transfer of Venue,
63 CORNELL L. REv. 149, 159-63 (1978). Variations among the states in defining com-
mencement would compound these problems.
'5 See note 79 supra.
96 For example, consider three states whose commencement procedures are, respective-
ly, at filing, at service of process, and at filing if service of process is made within 60 days
of filing. The limitations period for the first two states is identical, although plaintiffs must
satisfy different requirements within that period. The third state, however, extends a de-
fendant's exposure to liability relative to the second state by allowing the plaintiff to toll
the statute of limitations for 60 days. In cases where the plaintiff is unable to immediately
serve the defendant and the limitations period is about to run, this can produce inequitable
results.
97
The statute of limitation establishes a deadline after which the defendant may
legitimately have peace of mind; it also recognizes that after a certain period of
time it is unfair to require the defendant to attempt to piece together his de-
fense to an old claim. A requirement of actual service promotes both of those
functions of the statute.... It is these policy aspects which made the service
requirement an "integral" part of the statute of limitations both in this case and
in Ragan. As such, the service rule must be considered part and parcel of the
statute of limitations.
100 S. Ct. at 1985-86 (footnote omitted).
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indicated the absence of a strong federal policy. 8 Hence, when
federal law borrows the statute of limitations from state law, uni-
formity and discouraging forum shopping are not compelling
considerations. In such situations, courts can fully implement the
substantive policies of the borrowed statute of limitations by also
borrowing the state commencement rule. At the same time, the
hybrid approach guarantees that when Congress has indicated a
strong policy by providing a federal limitations period, a uniform
federal commencement rule will apply. The hybrid approach,
however, would increase procedural disuniformity within the
federal court system and might create new traps for unwary liti-
gants.
CONCLUSION
More than three decades after its decision in Ragan v. Mer-
chants Transfer & Warehouse Co., the Supreme Court held in Walker
v. Armco Steel Corp. that state commencement procedure, rather
than rule 3, tolls the statute of limitations in diversity actions.
Walker does not, however, merely reaffirm Ragan. Walker goes
beyond Ragan by holding that the plain meaning of rule 3 pre-
cludes its application as a tolling provision in diversity actions.
The Court's methodology, however, is flawed. Although purport-
ing to determine the scope of the rule by examining its plain
meaning, the Court undermined this rationale by focusing on the
substantive nature of the state commencement procedure.
Moreover, the Court failed to analyze the choice of law problem
in a manner consistent with Erie and its progeny, merely conclud-
ing that state law should be adopted in the absence of an applic-
able federal rule. Finally, Walker casts doubt on the continued ap-
plication of rule 3 to toll statutes of limitations in actions to en-
force federally created rights. The Walker Court expressly re-
served the question of the role of rule 3 in actions based on
federal law. To promote procedural uniformity in the federal
courts and the federal policy of removing unnecessary traps for
litigants, federal courts should continue to hold that the filing of a
complaint tolls statutes of limitations in actions to enforce
federally created rights.
Mark N. Parry
0 When Congress has not set the statute of limitations, uniformity does not necessitate
the displacement of the state commencement procedure. "The need for uniformity, while
paramount under some statutory schemes, has not been held to warrant the displacement
of state statutes of limitations .... " Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 100 S. Ct. 1790, 1797
(1980).
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